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ABSTRACT
Current English law has few controls on the involuntary treatment of
persons detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. In 2001, R (Wilk-
inson) v. Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority provided some hope
that, in conjunction with the Human Rights Act and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR), meaningful substantive and pro-
cedural standards for compulsory psychiatric treatment might be
developed, but that hope has not been fulfilled. Using Wilkinson and
the ECHR jurisprudence as a starting point, this article considers
when, if at all, compulsory psychiatric treatment might be justified. In
particular, it considers the difference between the ‘appropriateness’
standard of the English legislation and the ECHR requirement of ‘thera-
peutic necessity’, the requirements for appropriate procedure and appro-
priate legislative clarity, how the courts should deal with disagreements
among treating physicians, and the relevance of the capacity and best
interests of the detained person.
Keywords: compulsory psychiatric treatment, compulsion, Herczegfalvy,
Wilkinson, Mental Health Act 1983, best interests, mental capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Mental Health Act 1983 as amended (most notably by the Mental
Health Act 2007) contains few restrictions on the compulsory psychia-
tric treatment of detained patients. There are restrictions on psychosur-
gery and electroconvulsive therapy, and treatment continuing beyond
three months requires a second opinion through a statutory scheme
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that it is ‘appropriate’, but that is all: any other psychiatric treatment of
detained patients may be given compulsorily, in the discretion of the
responsible clinician.
A decade ago, a possibility was created that some significant explora-
tion of the limits of this discretion might occur. R (Wilkinson) v. Broad-
moor Special Hospital Authority1 was on its face a procedural case
about whether cross-examination of witnesses was permitted under a
judicial review application, but it held the potential to open up a
range of substantive questions about compulsory treatment to judicial
scrutiny. Previous cases had for example tested the breadth of the
phrase ‘treatment for mental disorder’ or sought confirmation that
medical treatment should be given when individuals lacked or were of
marginal capacity, but Wilkinson was about the administration of anti-
psychotic medication in circumstances that were clearly within the legal
parameters of the statute: this was unquestionably treatment for mental
disorder of a person detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. The
question was instead whether notwithstanding the domestic law the
treatment should be enforced.
The primary ‘hook’ for this issue was the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), following the Human Rights Act 1998 taking
effect the previous year. On the ECHR issues, the court held that
neither Wednesbury nor even super-Wednesbury would be a sufficient
standard of review.2 A full-merits hearing was instead necessary, with
cross-examination of witnesses available when appropriate. In reaching
that result, the Court of Appeal opened up a very interesting substantive
discussion as to the scope of permissible compulsory treatment, and
made it clear that the courts had a role in ensuring that any compulsory
treatment was indeed within that permissible scope. The stage seemed
set for the development of a sophisticated jurisprudence on the scope
of compulsory treatment under the Mental Health Act 1983.
That promise, sadly, was not fulfilled. It would seem that there have
been a total of nine relevant decisions flowing from Wilkinson including
both first instance and appellate judgments, relating to five applicants.3
All concerned the pre-2007 standard for compulsory treatment that had
1 [2001] EWCA 1545, hereinafter Wilkinson.
2 Wilkinson at para 36 (per Simon Brown L.J.); para 53 (per Brooke L.J.),
para 83 (per Hale L.J.).
3 There is one case concerning PS, (R (PS) v G [2003] EWHC 2335 (Admin)),
three concerning B (R (B) v SS [2005] EWHC 86 (Admin); R (B) v SS [2005]
EWHC 1936 (Admin); R (B) v SS [2006] EWCA Civ 28), two concerning N
(R (N) v M [2002] EWHC 1911 (Admin); R (N) v M [2002] EWCA Civ
1789), two concerning JB (R (B) v Haddock [2005] EWHC 921 and [2006]
EWCA Civ 961) and one concerning Taylor (R (Taylor) v Haydn-Smith
[2005] EWHC 1668 (Admin)).
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continued beyond three months. All applicants have been unsuccessful,
at all stages in their proceedings. Since 2006, the cases appear to have
ground to a halt entirely. Little has been attained by way of clarifying
the scope of permitted compulsion in psychiatric treatment.
The issues at the heart of Wilkinson, and in particular the question of
when, if at all, compulsory psychiatric treatment is permissible, have not
gone away. If anything, the legislative changes in 2007 weakened the test
for compulsion, making the issues more pressing. While ECHR require-
ments will be pivotal to any debate in England regarding compulsory
treatment, they are to be a floor and not a ceiling, and there is no
reason that the discussion of standards of enforced treatment should
be limited to ECHR analysis. Indeed, it will be argued below that the
ECHR standards are themselves underdeveloped in this area, and the
discussion advanced by this paper applies to a considerable degree to
establishing meaningful ECHR standards, as well as to standards appli-
cable in England and Wales. In addition to the ECHR standards, per-
sonnel enforcing treatment are exercising public law powers, and their
actions must therefore be defensible according to general public law
standards. The public law standard of review is super-Wednesbury,4
and thus somewhat less than for cases under the Human Rights Act,
but there is a public law standard, nonetheless.
There are also ethical issues that come into play, and other inter-
national law, most significantly the new United Nations Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).5 It is still too early
to write with any certainty about how the CRPD will be interpreted,
and a detailed analysis will not be offered by this paper. That said,
the CRPD includes a right to medical treatment based on consent,6
and adopts a new approach that maximises capacity.7 All of this,
along with the Convention’s other guarantees, is to be provided in a fra-
mework that is free of discrimination:8 the expectation is that choices
cannot be imposed on persons with disabilities when they are not
imposed on persons without disabilities. It does seem clear that at the
very least, much clearer justifications will be required for compulsory
treatment in the coming years, if it is to be permitted at all, and it
would be well to start a serious discussion of these issues now.
4 See R (Brady) v Collins (2000) 58 BMLR 173.
5 See United Nations General Assembly, A/61/611 (6 December 2006). The pro-
visions concerning consent are contained in Art 25(d). Both the main CPRD
and its first optional protocol, which allows for individual complaints to the
CRPD Committee, took effect on 3May 2008. The UK has signed and ratified
both the CRPD and the option protocol.
6 Art 25(d).
7 Art 12.
8 Art 5.
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II. COMPULSORY TREATMENT AS A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE
There seems to be a reluctance in the courts to acknowledge that com-
pulsory treatment actually raises human rights concerns. In R (JB) v
Haddock, for example, Auld L.J. held that ECHR safeguards should
not be interpreted ‘to cut across the grain of good medical practice’.9
This is perhaps based on an apparent sense in the wider world that psy-
chiatric medication is unproblematic, with the reliable positive effects
vastly and manifestly outweighing any negative effects. How else can
one explain, for example, the statement by health minister Paul
Boatang when the Richardson Committee was established that there is
‘a responsibility on individual patients to comply with their programmes
of care’ and that ‘[n]on compliance can no longer be an option when
appropriate care in appropriate settings is in place’.10 The image is
one of no down-side to psychiatric medications.
Sadly, this is not a balanced reflection of the effects of the drugs.
The benefits of psychiatric medication are not necessarily clear-cut,
and the risks can be significant.11 Indeed, more people now die
from the adverse effects of anti-psychotic medication than are killed
by people as a result of their mental disorder.12 Adverse effects of
antipsychotic drugs include obesity, diabetes, and dizziness. They
also cause ‘extrapyramidal symptoms’, including parkinsonian symp-
toms (including tremors), dystonia (abnormal face and body move-
ments), akathesia (restlessness), and tardive dyskinesia (rhythmic
involuntary movements particularly of the tongue, lips, face, hands,
and feet). These effects can be permanent. Even in the newer antipsy-
chotics, these extrapyramidal symptoms occur in 35–55% of cases.13
Depression is normally treated with either tricyclic medication or
selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors (SSRIs). Tricyclic medication
9 R (JD) v Haddock [2006] EWCA Civ 961 para 33.
10 Department of Health, Review of the Mental Health Act 1983 (Department
of Health, 1999), 142 (Richardson Report).
11 Unless otherwise indicated, medical information in this paragraph is drawn
from Joint Formulary Committee [United Kingdom], British National
Formulary (49th edn 2005) sections 4.2 and 4.3. The British National
Formulary is available online free of charge at ,http://www.bnf.org..
12 Deaths from anti-psychotic medication from 1997 to 2008 inclusive were
749: see written response by Jil Matheson, National Statistician, to Parlia-
mentary Question 302898, HC Deb, 2 December 2009, column 825W.
Homicides in the same period by people with mental illness at the time of
the homicide were 658: National Confidential Inquiry into Suicide and
Homicide by People with Mental Illness, Annual Report (University of
Manchester, 2011).
13 J Bobes and others, ‘Frequency of Extrapyramidal Adverse Reactions in
Schizophrenic Outpatients Treated with Risperidone, Olanzapine,
Quetiapine or Haloperidol: Results of the EIRE Study’ (2002) 22 Clinical
Drug Investigation 609.
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can cause heart problems, and deaths from heart attacks do some-
times occur. SSRIs can also cause nausea, gastro-intestinal problems
and, less frequently, vascular problems. Medication may also interfere
with the individual’s lifestyle: much anti-psychotic medication has
sedative properties, leaving an individual feeling drowsy or apathetic.
These drugs also cause impotence or other sexual dysfunction in
approximately 45% of individuals.14
This is not to deny the beneficial effects of these drugs in many (but
not all) cases; it is instead to serve as a reminder that they can also be
harmful. Consistent with this, the 2009 report of the United Nations
Special Rapporteur for the Prevention of Torture notes the need for
close scrutiny of any non-consensual administration of psychiatric medi-
cation.15 These are serious treatments, with serious human rights impli-
cations. That cannot be ignored in states that purport to take human
rights seriously.
The reasons for treatment refusal are many and varied. Certainly,
psychoses and similar manifestations of mental illness will be relevant
in some cases, but there are other reasons for treatment refusal and
non-adherence. Unsurprisingly, the presence of adverse effects is a sig-
nificant factor: as extrapyramidal effects occur, refusals increase.16
Further, weight gain and sexual dysfunction are significant in
service user attitudes to medication. In one study, obese people
were more than twice as likely as people with normal body mass
ratio to cease medication,17 and in another, 42% of men skipped
medication because of sexual dysfunction.18 It would seem that
relations between service user and prescribing physician are also rel-
evant: poor communication between the two, and a lack of trust in
14 See M Olfson and others, ‘Male Sexual Dysfunction and Quality of Life in
Schizophrenia’ (2005) 66 J Clin Psychiatry 331; K Rosenberg and others,
‘A Survey of Sexual Side Effects among Severely Mentally Ill Patients
Taking Psychotropic Medications: Impact on Compliance’ (2003) 29 J Sex
Marital Ther 289; T Apantaku-Olajide and others, ‘Drug-induced Sexual
Dysfunction and Mental Health Patients’ Attitude to Psychotropic Medi-
cations’ (2011) 26 Sex Relation Ther 145.
15 Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (M Nowak), Interim Report,
General Assembly A/63/175 (27 July 2008), para 63.
16 D Robertson and others, ‘Predictors of Medication Discontinuation by
Patients with First-episode Schizophrenia and Schizoaffective Disorder’
(2002) 57 Schizophr Res 209; M Lambert and others, ‘Impact of Present
and Past Antipsychotic Side Effects on Attitude Toward Typical Antipsycho-
tic Treatment and Adherence’ (2004) 19 Eur Psychiatry 415.
17 P Weiden and others, ‘Obesity as a Risk Factor for Antipsychotic Noncom-
pliance’ (2004) 66 Schizophr Res 51.
18 Rosenburg, n 16. See also Lambert, n 16.
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the physician appear to predict treatment refusal.19 These factors all
tie together in complex ways. Thus it would seem that psychiatrists
are not good at identifying the adverse effects of relevance to
service users when explaining proposed treatment,20 and the use of
compulsion can undercut the trust between psychiatrist and
patient.21 Treatment refusals are thus a complex phenomenon, and
the views of service users warrant appropriate respect. Courts have
not necessarily acknowledged this, as in R (B) v Haddock, where
Collins J. declined to hear the evidence of the patient, on the basis
that ‘it did not seem to me that his evidence would conceivably
assist me in reaching my decision’.22
Further, it cannot be assumed that service users retrospectively
approve of coercive measures to which they are subject (the ‘thank-you’
theory). Certainly, some do, and initial indications are that this may be
particularly true when decisions are made on behalf of people lacking
capacity. A study by Owen and colleagues of people lacking capacity
admitted to London psychiatric facilities found 83% of those regaining
capacity giving retrospective approval of the decisions made on their
behalf.23 The sample size for this study was only 35, but nonetheless
the proportion of retrospective approvals is impressive. Other studies
of retrospective views of coercion provide fewer grounds for optimism.
In Priebe’s study of service user views a year after hospitalisation, only
40% of the 396 patients interviewed thought their involuntary admis-
sion justified.24 This is broadly consistent with the smaller study by Gar-
diner and Lidz of retrospective approval of admissions in America,
where roughly half of the sixty-five patients who did not think their
detention justified when it occurred changed their view over time, but
Gardner and Lidz note that even those who retrospectively viewed
their detention as justified did not change in the way they felt about
the admission: those that were angry at the time of admission were
still angry. Even those who viewed their detentions as justified were
19 See discussion in A Mitchell and T Selmes, ‘Why Don’t Patients Take Their
Medicine? Reasons and Solutions in Psychiatry’ (2007) 13 Adv Psychiatr
Treat 336.
20 J Day, P Kinderman and R Bentall, ‘A Comparison of Patients’ and Prescri-
bers’ Beliefs about Neuroleptic Side-effects: Prevalence, Distress and Causa-
tion’ (1998) 97 Acta Psychiatr Scand 93.
21 R Kaltiala-Heino, P Laippala and R Salokangas, ‘Impact of Coercion on
Treatment Outcome’ (1997) 20 Int’l JL Psychiatry 311.
22 [2005] EWHC 921 (Admin) para 14.
23 G Owen and others, ‘Retrospective Views of Psychiatric In-patients Regain-
ing Mental Capacity’ (2009) 195 Br J Psychiatry 403.
24 S Priebe and others, ‘Patients’ Views and Readmissions 1 Year after Involun-
tary Hospitalisation’ (2009) 194 Br Med J 49. The authors consider that this
may in fact be higher than the actual number, as roughly half of their original
sample dropped out prior to the interview at the one year period.
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still not grateful. Gardiner and Lidz view this as flowing from the feeling
of injury consequent on the coercive elements of the detention, and the
consequent loss of autonomy.25 Consistent with this, Katsakou finds
treatment satisfaction among those subject to enforced treatment
lower than for those not coerced.26 One thus cannot assume that
patients are grateful for the treatment received; and when they are
not, they can perceive the coerced treatment as remarkably violative –
a reaction not necessarily noted or acknowledged by their professional
carers27 or the courts.
The standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)
expressly preserve the decision-making rights over treatment of
persons detained in psychiatric facilities:
Patients should, as a matter of principle, be placed in a position to
give their free and informed consent to treatment. The admission of
a person to a psychiatric establishment on an involuntary basis
should not be construed as authorising treatment without his
consent. It follows that every competent patient, whether voluntary
or involuntary, should be given the opportunity to refuse treatment
or other medical intervention. Any derogation from this fundamen-
tal principle should be based upon law and only relate to clearly
and strictly defined exceptional circumstances.28
This is consistent with jurisprudence in the United States, where such
decision-making rights of persons detained in psychiatric facilities
were held to be a constitutional principle in Rogers v Okin and
Rennie v Klein thirty years ago.29 Scotland, too, now allows compulsory
psychiatric or other medical treatment only after a hearing before a
25 See W Gardiner and others, ‘Patients’ Revisions of Their Beliefs about the
Need for Hospitalization’ (1999) 156 Am J Psychiatry 1385; and
W Gardner and C Lidz, ‘Gratitude and Coercion between Physicians and
Patients (2001) 31 Psychiatr Ann 125.
26 C Katsakou and others, ‘Treatment Satisfaction among Involuntary Patients’
(2010) 61 Psychiatr Serv 286, 290. This study also finds that the relevant
measure of coercion is the perceived coercion by the service user, not the
formal legal mechanism, reminding us of the complex relationship between
legal mechanisms and the experience of coercion.
27 K Haglud and others, ‘Forced Medication in Psychiatric Care: Patient
Experiences and Nurse Perceptions’ (2003) 10 J Psychiatr Ment Health
Nurs 65.
28 CPT Standards, CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1, Rev 2004, p. 57, para 41.
29 Rennie v Klein 653 F 2d. 836 (USCA, 1981); Rogers v Okin 634 F 2d 650
(USSC, 1980); Rogers v Okin 738 F 2d 1 (USCA, 1984). A similar position
has been adopted in Eire – see Mental Health Act (2001), discussed in
detail by M Donnelly, ‘Treatment for a Mental Disorder: the Mental
Health Act 2001, Consent and the Role of Rights’ (2005) IJ 220.
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review tribunal, based on specific substantive and procedural safe-
guards.30 None of these regimes entirely prohibit involuntary treatment;
but all make it clear that compulsion is permitted only in strictly defined
circumstances and only following appropriate procedural safeguards.
III. THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT PROVISIONS
The current law relating to treatment of detained patients is governed by
part 4 of the Mental Health Act 1983. The general rule is contained in
section 63:
The consent of a patient shall not be required for any medical treat-
ment given to him for mental disorder from which he is suffering,
not being a form of treatment to which section 57, 58, or 58A
applies, if the treatment is given under the direction of the approved
clinician in charge of the treatment.
The starting position of the legislation is therefore that the consent of
patients is not required. While this applies only to ‘treatment . . . for
mental disorder’, the courts have been expansive as to the meaning of
this phrase, interpreting it in some circumstances to include enforced
feeding,31 Caesarean section operations,32 and ‘milieu therapy’.33
If treatment is for mental disorder, the legislation provides few safe-
guards. Psychosurgery may be performed only following the competent
consent of the patient and the provision of a second opinion by a second
opinion approved doctor (SOAD) – a psychiatrist appointed through
the statutory scheme managed by the Care Quality Commission.34
30 Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Act 2003, asp 13, part 7.
31 See R (Brady) v Collins (2001) 58 BMLR 173 (QB); B v Croydon DHA
(1994) 22 BMLR 13, affd [1995] 1 All ER 689 (CA).
32 See Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v CH [1996] 1 FLR
762 (Fam).
33 See MD v Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust [2010] UKUT 59 (AAC);
Reid v Sec State for Scotland [1999] 1 All ER 481 (PC). ‘Milieu therapy’
occurs when the structured environment of the ward results in a reduction
in the manifestations of an individual’s disorder. The Code of Practice
draws the distinction between ‘nursing and specialist day-to-day care’,
which can be treatment for mental disorder, and ‘simply detaining
someone – even in a hospital’, which cannot; but in practice it is difficult
to see clear distinctions between these: see Department of Health, Code of
Practice: Mental Health Act 1983 (London: The Stationery Office, 2008),
para 6.17–18.
34 See s 57(1)(a). By regulation, the ‘surgical implantation of hormones for the
purpose of reducing male sex drive’ is subject to similar restrictions (see SI
2008/1184, reg 27), but this has no practical effect as it does not cover
hormone analogues (the prevalent current treatment), nor the oral adminis-
tration of these substances (the current preferred method of administration):
see R (X) v MHAC (1988) 9 BMLR 77 at 85.
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Restrictions also exist for electro-convulsive therapy, most significantly
that it may be refused by a competent patient.35
Otherwise, the only statutory restriction on compulsory treatment
commences 3 months after medication is first given to the patient
in his or her period of detention. From that time, treatment may
occur if either the patient has capacity and consents to the treatment,
or if a SOAD certifies that the patient either lacks capacity or is not
consenting to treatment and that ‘it is appropriate for the treatment
to be given’.36 This is a new standard, introduced by the Mental
Health Act 2007. Previously, the SOAD had been required to
certify that ‘having regard to the likelihood of its alleviating or pre-
venting a deterioration of [the patient’s] condition the treatment
should be given’. This is not merely a cosmetic change. In Wilkinson,
the court held contrary to the then current guidance that SOADs were
not merely to certify that proposed treatment was ‘reasonable in light
of the general consensus of appropriate treatment’; they were instead
to reach their own independent judgment based on the section 58 cri-
teria.37 While the Code of Practice now requires the SOAD to reach
an independent decision, the move to an ‘appropriateness’ test may
well mean that it is now a decision as to the reasonableness of the
treating physician’s approach. This suggests a shift towards a Bolam-
style threshold, rather than a test of what the SOAD would have done
himself or herself. The ‘appropriateness’ language further mirrors the
change to the previous treatability requirements for detention under
section 3 of the Mental Health Act, and the changes in that
context were broadly perceived as lowering the requirements for con-
finement of people for whom the old treatability test applied. The
ramifications of that change will be discussed further below; but it
is worth noting here that all the post-Wilkinson cases rely on the
pre-2007 wording of section 58, and the standard appears to have
fallen since that time.
Even for those patients within its remit, it is not obvious howmuch real
protection the SOAD scheme offers. In 2008, while SOADs rec-
ommended some change to treatment plans in roughly one case in four,
most of these were ‘slight’. ‘Significant’ amendments were required in
35 S 58A.
36 S 58(3).
37 Wilkinson para 32–33, 71; see also discussion in P Bowen, ‘Detained Patients
and the Right to Refuse Treatment’ [2002] JMHL 59, 61. A similar point is
made by the Court of Appeal in R (B) v S [2006] EWCACiv 28; see also dis-
cussion in P Hope, ‘Paternalism or Power? – Compulsory Treatment Under
Section 58 of the Mental Health Act 1983’ [2006] JMHL 90, 99.
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only about 4% of cases.38 There may be a variety of reasons for the rela-
tive rarity of these changes; but the high level of agreement is notable.
The SOAD system takes effect only after the first 3months of detention
– significantly longer than most detentions last. In the initial 3-month
period, all psychiatric treatments except psychosurgery and ECT may
be enforced at the discretion of the patient’s responsible clinician. In
2009–10, 45,755 people were detained under the Mental Health Act
1983; SOAD opinions were given regarding these people in 8,781 cases
– just under 20%.39 For more than 80% of persons detained, therefore,
compulsory treatment was at the sole discretion of their responsible clin-
ician acting under the authority of section 63, with no formal safeguards
or procedures required at any time. In its final report prior to its incorpor-
ation into the Care Quality Commission, the Mental Health Act Com-
mission noted the deficiencies of this situation:
It is seems quite possible that the absence of an external safeguard
in relation to the imposition of medication without consent for such
a period will, at some future point, be found incompatible with
human rights obligations, given modern medical practice and
pharmacopoeia.40
Section 58 does provide some statutory language for the SOAD in deter-
mining whether treatment should be compelled, but both sections 58
and 63 are silent on the standard for compulsion to be applied by the
responsible clinician. It is difficult to see that the standard for respon-
sible clinicians can be lower than for the SOAD. Section 58 establishes
an appropriateness test for the SOAD; could it really be defensible that a
responsible clinician would impose inappropriate treatment? For
SOADs and responsible clinicians alike, however, some courts in the
post-Wilkinson jurisprudence have acknowledged that even the stron-
ger, pre-2007s fifty-eight test is not sufficient, and have provided more
expansive dicta as to how the compulsion decision is to be approached.
These dicta flow in part from the courts’ interpretation of the relevant
portions of the ECHR, and will be discussed following an introduction
to the relevant ECHR case law, and the courts’ interpretation of it.
38 Mental Health Act Commission, Coercion and Consent: Monitoring
the Mental Health Act 2007–9, being the thirteenth biennial report of the
Mental Health Act Commission (The Stationery Office, London 2009),
figure 50.
39 Care Quality Commission, Monitoring the Use of the Mental Health Act in
2009–10 (CQC, 2010) at 19, 83.
40 Mental Health Act Commission, see n 38, para 3.17. (13th biennial report of
the Mental Health Act Commission.)
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IV. THE ECHR
The introduction of the ECHR into domestic law through the Human
Rights Act 1998 provides the legal structure of the Wilkinson and post-
Wilkinson decisions. This is problematic, as the ECHR case law is in a
variety of respects unconvincing.41
The key case is Herczegfalvy v Austria.42 While Herczegfalvy remains
the fundamental Strasbourg case on psychiatric treatment, its interpret-
ation is problematic, and raises as many questions as it answers. It was
not primarily a treatment case at all: the considerable bulk of the
decision is spent on finer points of the distinction between detention
under Article 5(1)(a) (criminals) and Article 5(1)(e) (persons of
unsound mind), a question on which it is now largely forgotten.
Insofar as it involved treatment, it is not entirely clear what the treat-
ment involved. Certainly, it included being handcuffed to a security
bed for a period of more than 2 weeks, and it included sedation to
allow treatment with perfusions, and a significant period of enforced
feeding, all of which were performed with considerable force. It also
seems to have included neuroleptic medication. The applicant had
been found some years prior at least partially to lack capacity; but the
facts are entirely unclear as to whether he lacked capacity for the specific
decisions at issue at the times those decisions actually arose.
At issue was whether the treatment constituted a violation of Article 3
(freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) or Article 8
(right to privacy and family life). The Court disposed of the Article 3
issue as follows:
82. The Court considers that the position of inferiority and power-
lessness which is typical of patients confined in psychiatric hospitals
calls for increased vigilance in reviewing whether the Convention
has been complied with. While it is for the medical authorities to
decide, on the basis of the recognised rules of medical science, on
the therapeutic methods to be used, if necessary by force, to pre-
serve the physical and mental health of patients who are entirely
incapable of deciding for themselves and for whom they are there-
fore responsible, such patients nevertheless remain under the pro-
tection of Article 3 (art. 3), whose requirements permit of no
derogation.
41 For a detailed discussion of the ECHR jurisprudence, see P Bartlett, O Lewis
and O Thorold, Mental Disability and the European Convention on Human
Rights, (Martinus Nijhof, Leiden 2007).
42 Application No. 10533/83, judgment 24 September 1992. (A/242-B) (1993)
15 EHRR 437.
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The established principles of medicine are admittedly in principle
decisive in such cases; as a general rule, a measure which is a thera-
peutic necessity cannot be regarded as inhuman or degrading. The
Court must nevertheless satisfy itself that the medical necessity has
been convincingly shown to exist.
No violation of Article 3 was found.
Because of the factual limitations of the case, it is difficult to know
quite how to read this passage. It seems that it is not restricted to indi-
viduals lacking capacity,43 but the paternalism implied in any broader
reading does not chime well with the languages of therapeutic alliances
and partnerships that have arisen since the judgment appeared, almost
20 years ago. What exactly is the scope of the phrase ‘therapeutic neces-
sity’? What evidence is required, and what criteria must the court
require to satisfy itself that the medical necessity has been ‘convincingly
shown to exist’? The Strasbourg court is itself extremely hesitant about
second-guessing domestic courts on matters of evidence – indeed, this is
a key reason why Wilkinson was itself found inadmissible by the Stras-
bourg court and did not progress to a full hearing.44 This is not, of
course, an argument that domestic tribunals should not themselves
develop suitably robust thresholds of evidence and procedure.
Even where the Court has not been prepared to say that a specific
medical treatment per se violates Article 3, the manner in which the
treatment is performed may constitute a violation.45 Indeed, there is jur-
isprudence that any use of force not strictly necessary is sufficient to
trigger Article 3 in detained populations.46 Thus handcuffing a prisoner
during chemotherapy,47 shaving a prisoner’s hair,48 and strip searches
conducted in an unduly invasive manner49 have all been held to be vio-
lations of Article 3 in circumstances where the facts did not warrant the
behaviour. If we are to accept that people detained in psychiatric
43 See Nevmerzhitsky v. the Ukraine, Application No. 54825/00, judgment of
12 October 2005.
44 See application no. 14659/02, judgment 28 February 2006 (2006) 13 Eur
JHL 186. The court also relied heavily on the integrity of the SOAD
system, a procedure that does not apply for 80% of detained patients, as
discussed above.
45 See, eg, Nevmerzhitsky v the Ukraine, Application No. 54825/00, judgment
of 12 October 2005.
46 Ribitsch v Austria, Application No. 18896/91, judgment 21 November 1995
(1995) 21 EHRR 573, para 38.
47 Mouisel v France, Application No. 67263/01, judgment 14 November 2002
(2004) 38 EHRR 34, para 48.
48 Yankov v Bulgaria, Application No. 39084/97, judgment 11 December 2003
(2005) 40 EHRR 36, para 120.
49 Valasinas v Lithuania, Application No. 44558/98, judgment 24 July 2001,
12 B.H.R.C. 2, para 117 and Van der Ven v the Netherlands, Application
No. 50901/99, judgment 4 February 2003 (2004) 38 EHRR 46, para 62.
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facilities must have at least the same rights as prisoners, then the manner
of enforcement of treatment will be of particular relevance. All these
cases are post-Herzcegfalvy, and it is fair to wonder how the court
would now approach the use of force in that case, in light of the
subsequent jurisprudence.
The case may actually be stronger for persons detained in psychiatric
facilities, based on the vulnerability of those people, noted by the court
in the quotation from Herczegfalvy above. This was certainly the
position in Keenan v the United Kingdom:
In particular, the assessment of whether the treatment or punish-
ment concerned is incompatible with the standards of Article 3
has, in the case of mentally ill persons, to take into consideration
their vulnerability and their inability, in some cases, to complain
coherently or at all about how they are being affected by any
particular treatment[.]50
The fact that Article 3 may be violated by the manner in which the
activity is done, even if the activity itself may themselves have been
objectively appropriate, opens a wide variety of questions in a psychia-
tric context about doctor–patient interactions, choices of medications,
and uses of force in implementing those choices, and in turn how
these issues relate to the broader question of therapeutic necessity. By
way of example, if a person with bipolar disorder is prepared to
consent to anti-depressant A but not to antidepressant B, can he or
she be forced to take B, assuming that there is little therapeutic reason
to choose between the two? If B is indeed better than A, can its better
efficacy be used to override the refusal, even if Awould also be an appro-
priate (but not the medically optimal) treatment? The existing jurispru-
dence does not provide clear answers.
If the treatment of Article 3 in Herczegfalvy is problematic, the treat-
ment of Article 8 is even more unsatisfactory. The court’s reasoning is
perfunctory:
86. The first two complaints relate to facts already complained of
from the point of view of Article 3 (art. 3). Reference should there-
fore first be made to paragraph 83 above. In addition, the Court
attaches decisive weight here to the lack of specific information
capable of disproving the Government’s opinion that the hospital
authorities were entitled to regard the applicant’s psychiatric
illness as rendering him entirely incapable of taking decisions for
50 Application No. 27229/95, judgment of 3 April 2001 (2001) 33 EHRR 38,
para 111.
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himself. Consequently, no violation of Article 8 (art. 8) has been
shown in this respect.
On one reading, this seems to say that people lacking capacity are unable
to claim violations of Article 8. That position must be incorrect: rights to
privacy and family life do not cease merely because an individual lacks
capacity. At a deeper level, the statement does not deal with the different
content and structures of Articles 3 and 8. Is it the intent of the Court to
say that the thresholds for engagement of Article 8 are the same as those
in Article 3, and that the therapeutic necessity test may be carried over as
the test for a violation of Article 8? That approach is rightly criticised by
Charles J. in R (B) v SS,51 but phrasing of paragraph 86 raises the ques-
tion of whether this is actually what the court meant. In any event, even
if (as seems likely) the criticism is correct, it raises the question of what is
required by Article 8, if not Article 3 standards and approach? Herczeg-
falvy does not provide an answer.
Unlike Article 3, which admits of no derogation, Article 8 initially
provides in paragraph (1) a right to private and family life, but allows
in paragraph (2) interference with that right when ‘in accordance with
the law’, and ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in the interests of,
inter alia, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health
or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Other ECHR jurisprudence would suggest that the threshold for
engagement of Article 8(1) is low in the case of institutional medical
treatment. YF v Turkey52 concerned a gynaecological examination of
a woman in police custody. The Court held that even a minor medical
intervention, if performed without consent, constituted an interference
with Article 8 rights. It was not clear whether YF had in fact consented,
but the court went on to hold that because of the control exercised over
YF flowing from her detention, she could not have been expected to
object to the examination. It therefore found an interference of her
rights under Article 8 even if she had consented.53 On this basis, it
would seem that most treatment of detained people in psychiatric facili-
ties – even treatment to which they consent – is likely to interfere with
the rights in Article 8(1), and require justification under Article 8(2).
Article 8(2) requires that the interference in question is ‘necessary in a
democratic society’ for one of the purposes listed in that sub-article.
While ‘necessary’ does not mean indispensible, it does mean more
than ordinary, reasonable, or desirable.54 For the overarching policy
51 [2005] EWHC 1936 (Admin), para 78–80.
52 Application No. 24209/94, judgment of 22 July 2003, (2004) 39 EHRR 34.
53 Paras 33–35.
54 Handyside v the United Kingdom (A/24) (1976) 1 EHRR 737.
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of compulsory psychiatric treatment, this will presumably require that
governments demonstrate a real need for treatment under compulsion.
The fact that compulsory treatment exists in most jurisdictions in the
world will presumably be noted by a court considering this issue, but
it is not analytically satisfying. Article 8(2) presumably requires govern-
ments to make a principled defense of their practice. This may be chal-
lenging. Compulsory treatment has long been a part of the mental health
law landscape, and its justifications are largely unspoken. It is not
obvious, for example, that it can be justified for public safety: ex
hypothesi, the individual subject to compulsory treatment under the
Mental Health Act 1983 is detained in a psychiatric facility, and the
public is not therefore at risk. Arguments based on the protection of
health are similarly problematic, in that they are based on the notion
that compulsory treatment produces significantly better health out-
comes than a lack of compulsion. In community settings, where the
most developed empirical literature exists, evidence for this proposition
is stubbornly elusive.55 It would also seem that, in most cases, people
who initially refuse treatment move on to take similar treatment
without legal compulsion after a relatively short time.56
We further know very little about the circumstances in which compul-
sory treatment is imposed. The experience of patients would suggest that
at least some compulsion flows from administrative short-cuts or press-
ures on clinicians’ time, and that better patient relations would reduce
the need for compulsion. Mark Gray, a member of the Service User
Review Panel of the Care Quality Commission, comments:
55 See S Kisely and others, ‘Compulsory community and involuntary outpatient
treatment for people with severe mental disorders’ (Cochrane Library, 2005),
available at ,http://www.thecochranelibrary.com.; R Churchill and
others, International Experiences of Using Community Treatment Orders,
(Institute of Psychiatry, London 2007).
56 It would seem that something in the range of 5–10% of patients refuse treat-
ment initially. In the classic study by Hoge and others, more than half of the
patients initially refusing treatment eventually agreed to treatment after a
mean period of 7 days. Of the remainder, roughly half were permitted by
their physicians to refuse medication, generally either because the refusal
was viewed as not medically unreasonable or because the physician viewed
it as in the longer term interest of the patient for the refusal to be complied
with: see S Hoge and others, ‘A Prospective, Multi-center Study of Patients’
Refusals of Antipsychotic Medication’ (1990) 47 Arch Gen Psychiatry 949.
Similar results are found in Kasper and others’ study, where 13% of patients
initially refused treatment, but of this group, 68% ended their refusal within
2 days (the median length of refusal), and 90% within 4 days: J Kasper and
others, ‘Prospective Study of Patients’ Refusal of Antipsychotic Medication
Under a Physician Discretion Review Procedure’ (1997) 154 Am J Psychiatry
483.
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The doctor tells you what you should have and then prescribes it.
There is no discussion or choice or any information leaflets given
to you to help you understand it. The only option left open to the
patient is to refuse the medication which results in an independent
doctor visiting you, who then can give you the information you
require and a helpful discussion.57
It is difficult to see that compulsion would be justified if consent would
follow from a full discussion of the drug and its effects.58 It is not clear
how frequently compulsion could be avoided by a different approach to
patient care; but it does seem that if compulsion is to be justified, much
clearer evidence should be required as to how it is used currently, and
the circumstances in which it is actually necessary, rather than merely
convenient.
Once Article 8(1) is engaged, the non-discrimination provisions of
Article 14 should also come into play for any justification under
Article 8(2). While disability is not one of the specifically enumerated
grounds in Article 14, the list in that article is not closed, and the
ECtHR has now held that it is included by implication.59 If this
approach is adopted regarding non-consensual treatment, it will be
necessary for governments to explain why such measures are necessary
for mental illnesses, but not for physical illnesses. It is not obvious that
this will be easy, based on health outcomes.
The ECHR further requires that domestic legislation be formulated
with a reasonable degree of specificity. The classic test, contained in
Sunday Times v the United Kingdom, requires sufficient precision that
the citizen may, with legal advice if necessary, reasonably foresee the
consequences of his or her actions.60 In the context of compulsory treat-
ment, the issue is not merely that the citizen – the patient in the current
context – can foresee the consequences of his or her actions; it is also
that the person imposing the compulsion (the responsible clinician,
here) is given sufficient guidance to ensure a reasonable degree of
57 Care Quality Commission, Monitoring the Use of the Mental Health Act in
2009/10 (Department of Health, 2010) 85. This may be a significant
problem. In Haglud’s study comparing service users’ and nurses’ experiences
of involuntary treatment, all patients interviewed proposed alternatives to
compulsion; no nurses did: K Haglud and others, ‘Forced Medication in
Psychiatric Care: Patient Experiences and Nurse Perceptions’ (2003) 10 J
Psychiatr Mental Health Nurs 65 at 70.
58 Regarding service user understanding more generally as a determinant of
drug compliance, see A Mitchell and T Selmes, ‘Why Don’t Patients Take
Their Medicine? Reasons and Solutions in Psychiatry’ (2007) 13 Adv
Psychiatr Treat 336, especially at 339–40, 43.
59 Glor v Switzerland, application no. 13444/04, judgment of 30 April 2009.
60 Sunday Times v the United Kingdom, Application no. 6538/74, judgment
26 April 1979, (1979) 2 EHRR 245, para 49.
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consistency between decision-makers. Absent such a standard, the
imposition of treatment becomes a matter of luck as to who is the
responsible clinician, and human rights become a lottery.
It is difficult to see that the Mental Health Act provisions meet this
standard. No substantive guidance is provided to responsible clinicians
as to how their discretion to impose treatment is to be exercised. Even
the non-binding Code of Practice is largely silent on the issue. The
Code does note that consent should be sought ‘wherever practicable’61
and that when consent is withdrawn ‘[t]he clinician in charge of the
treatment must consider whether to proceed in the absence of
consent, to provide alternative treatment instead or to give no further
treatment’.62 It notes the possibility of infringements of Articles 3 and
8 of the ECHR, but claims that ‘[s]crupulous adherence to the require-
ments of the legislation and good clinical practice should ensure that
there is no such incompatibility’.63 It is difficult to see that this provides
meaningful guidance. As there are no additional procedural safeguards
for the first 3 months of detention, the Act provides no substantive cri-
teria in this period. Even beyond this period, it is difficult to see that the
‘appropriateness’ test of section 58 provides anything resembling the
level of certainty required by the Sunday Times test. Some guidance
for SOADs is provided by the Code of Practice,64 but there is no mech-
anism in place to determine whether it is being followed.
V. ISSUES FROM THE POST-WILKINSON JURISPRUDENCE
A. ‘Appropriate’ Treatment and ‘Therapeutically Necessary’
Treatment
As noted above, the provision of treatment which is not ‘therapeutically
necessary’ to detained patients risks violation of Article 3. The post-
Wilkinson jurisprudence is directed to the pre-2007 test for SOADs,
that ‘having regard to the likelihood of its alleviating or preventing a
deterioration of [the patient’s] condition, the treatment should be
given’. Since the 2007 Act took effect in 2009, the test has instead
become whether it is ‘appropriate that the treatment be given’.65
There are a variety of difficulties with this standard. The first is that
it would appear to set a standard well below therapeutic necessity.
61 Code of Practice, para 23.27.
62 Code of Practice, para 23.38.
63 Code of Practice, para 23.41.
64 Code of Practice, para 24.58; Care Quality Commission, ‘Guidance for
SOADs: Consent to Treatment & the SOAD Role Under the Revised
Mental Health Act’ (CQC, 2008) Appendix A.
65 MHA s 58(3)(b), as amended by the MHA 2007.
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Many treatments may appropriately be prescribed which are not thera-
peutically necessary. Treatments which attack the symptoms of a dis-
order but not the underlying disease are an obvious example. It may
be entirely appropriate that doctors prescribe medication that merely
makes us feel better (painkillers, for example); but patients refusing
such medication will not necessarily get better any slower than those
taking it. Such medication cannot be seen as therapeutically necessary,
if what is meant by that is treating the underlying disorder or improving
outcomes.
Therapeutic necessity also implies a severity to the disorder that is to
be treated: treatment of minor or unthreatening conditions may cer-
tainly be appropriate; it is less obvious that it is therapeutically necessary
to a degree that warrants compulsion, at least in the absence of incapa-
city. Consistent with this, some jurisdictions impose criteria related to
the severity of the condition, before compulsory treatment may be
given. Generally, these refer to the safety of the patient or others.66
The Court of Appeal in R(N) v (M) went some way to defining a stan-
dard of medical necessity:
The answer to that question will depend on a number of factors,
including (a) how certain is it that the patient does suffer from a
treatable mental disorder; (b) how serious a disorder is it; (c)
how serious a risk is presented to others; (d) how likely is it that,
if the patient does suffer from such a disorder, the proposed treat-
ment will alleviate the condition; (e) how much alleviation is there
likely to be; (f ) how likely is it that the treatment will have adverse
consequences for the patient; and (g) how severe may they be.67
This goes some way to establishing a framework, but it does little to
determine a standard. The cases have not required formal evidence
directed to these factors, and as noted, no patient has yet successfully
challenged a decision to treat with compulsion, suggesting that the
current requirements are not high.
No standard is in the Mental Health Act 1983 itself. The Act does
provide that ‘it is appropriate for treatment to be given to a patient if
the treatment is appropriate in his case, taking into account the nature
66 See, eg, Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act, s 57(3)(c).
Safety-based standards also exist in America; see Hightower by Dahler v
Olmstead, 959 F. Supp. 1549 (N.D. Ga. 1996), Fisk v Letterman, 501
F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D. N.Y. 2007). Matter of Gertrude K., 177 Misc. 2d
25, 675 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. 1998). These jurisdictions generally also
require a lack of capacity or similar standard of impaired decision-making
prior to involuntary treatment: see, eg, Matter of Joseph O., 245 A.D.2d
856, 666 N.Y.S.2d 322 (3d Dep’t 1997), and s 57(3)(d) of the Scots Act.
67 [2002] EWHC 1911 (Admin) para 19.
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and degree of the mental disorder and all other circumstances of his
case’.68 It is not obvious that this advances interpretation much,
although it does seem to focus the evaluation on the individual
patient, taking into account medical and non-medical factors. While a
multi-faceted analysis may be desirable in the context of deciding
on treatment under compulsion, it is problematic to apply to the
Herczegfalvy standard, which refers expressly to the ‘principles of
medical science’ and ‘therapeutic’ necessity. The Herczegfalvy standard
seems to reflect an internalist medical discourse, where the statutory
approach is expressly wider than this. The expansion to a wider field
of analysis is appealing, in its acknowledgement that appropriateness
of compulsion involves the actual effect on the individual patient, not
merely internalist medical health outcomes. This broader approach is
visible in cases such as Keenan, noted above; but it is less obvious
how it integrates with the more insular medicalism Herczegfalvy.
The broader range of factors further creates problems of its own. It
appears to mean that enforced treatment of a person from one culture
would constitute an ECHR violation where the same treatment in the
same circumstances of a person from another culture would not.
This is intuitively problematic, and potentially engages the non-
discrimination provisions of Article 14. At the same time, there may
well be cases where failure to take cultural difference into account
may itself trigger an ECHR claim, including a claim under Article 14.
The expectation that a history of sexual abuse will be discussed in
detail with a male therapist may impact very differently on women
from different cultural or religious backgrounds, for example. This in
turn opens up a wide range of issues about what is required by different
religions or cultures, and how far human rights law should take that into
account – issues outside the scope of this paper, but issues that need to
be thought through with care if compulsion is to be justified. It seems
very unlikely that they were considered in the rather bald language of
the Herzcegfalvy decision.
The language of ‘appropriateness’ reflects the similar phrase ‘appro-
priate medical treatment’, which must be ‘available’ for detention
beyond 28 days.69 This test is discussed in some length in chapter 6 of
the Code of Practice, and it may be that the similarity of language will
mean that courts turn to this as an aid to interpreting the section 58
standard. This should be approached with considerable care, if at all.
The Code notes that chapter 6 is about the test in the context of deten-
tion and supervised community treatment.70 Detention and involuntary
68 S 64(3).
69 S 3(2)(d) and 3(4).
70 Code of Practice, para 6.1.
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treatment are different decisions, with potentially quite different justifi-
cations. A key issue in detention may for example be public safety; but
once the individual is detained, this objective is largely met. Justifica-
tions for compulsory treatment are different. As an ethical question, it
may be quite appropriate to require appropriate treatment to be avail-
able prior to detention; it is quite a different thing to say that because
appropriate treatment is available, it should be administered by
compulsion.
Chapter 6 of the Code requires that appropriate treatment ‘must be
treatment which is for the purpose of alleviating or preventing a worsen-
ing of the patient’s mental disorder or its symptoms or manifes-
tations’.71 This seems inoffensive, but not particularly enlightening in
the context of compulsory treatment, beyond reinforcing the require-
ment in section 63 that the treatment must be for the mental disorder.
More problematic are the Code’s comments regarding the purposes of
the treatment:
6.4 Purpose is not the same as likelihood. Medical treatment may
be for the purpose of alleviating, or preventing a worsening of, a
mental disorder even though it cannot be shown in advance that
any particular effect is likely to be achieved.
* * *
6.6 Even if particular mental disorders are likely to persist or get
worse despite treatment, there may well be a range of interventions
which would represent appropriate medical treatment. It should
never be assumed that any disorders, or any patients, are inherently
or inevitably untreatable. Nor should it be assumed that likely dif-
ficulties in achieving long-term and sustainable change in a person’s
underlying disorder make medical treatment to help manage their
condition and the behaviours arising from it either inappropriate
or unnecessary.
On one level, these statements are perfectly sensible. The first is an
acknowledgement that medicine can be an inexact science. Patients
with physical ailments may well consent to treatments that have uncer-
tain outcomes, and there may be no suggestion that they are treated
inappropriately in those circumstances. The same uncertainties exist
with psychiatric care. The second paragraph is an encouraging
statement to the effect that clinicians should not give up on patients.
This seems entirely laudable.
71 Code of Practice para 6.8.
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As standards for compulsory administration of treatment, however,
these paragraphs are highly problematic. The Article 3 test flowing
from the ECHR focuses to a marked degree on therapeutic necessity;
that is not the same standard as therapeutic appropriateness. There is
a difference between treatment a reasonable and competent patient
might choose for himself or herself, and treatment which warrants com-
pulsion. Other jurisdictions include requirements regarding the likeli-
hood of success of treatment as part of their compulsion criteria,72
and this makes sense. Can it really be said that a treatment is a thera-
peutic necessity, when likelihood of a given result cannot be shown?
In what sense can treatment that will not achieve long-term and sustain-
able change in a person’s underlying disorder be understood as thera-
peutically necessary? The benefits that flow from the treatment must
also, presumably, meet some sort of substantive threshold of degree of
benefit to be ‘necessary’. The Code quite rightly notes in paragraph
6.15 that stabilization of a condition that would otherwise worsen
may sometimes be all that is realistic, and it is possible to imagine
that treatments that will reliably achieve this end might sometimes
meet a therapeutic necessity test; but the outcomes of treatment over
non-treatment must presumably be real, significant, and manifest if
treatment is to be considered ‘necessary’. It is one thing to allow patients
with capacity to choose to take treatment with significant risks and
uncertain outcomes; it is quite another to compel them to do so.
An approach requiring reasonable certainty may be problematic in
practice. Often, the predictability of the result will increase with a
history of the use of the intervention in the patient’s case: if drug A
worked the last time, it may well work this time, if the individual’s
symptoms are similar. Two potential difficulties flow from this. The
first is that it will be difficult to apply to people in their first episodes
of mental ill health, when the track record has not been established.
In practice, it seems that responses to serious mental illness involve a
considerable amount of trial and error by clinicians in individual
cases, trying to find the drug or drug combination that gets the best
result with the fewest adverse effects. The results of this process can
be mixed: sometimes, drug combinations are found which largely
alleviate the disorder with minimal adverse effects; sometimes drug
treatments have minimal beneficial effects, following considerable
unpleasant adverse effects. In these circumstances, knowledge of prob-
able outcomes in the specific case may be low, and the above standard
would not allow compulsory treatment to be used to establish the thera-
peutic history that would reach the optimal treatment. While the
72 See, eg, Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act, s 57(3)(b).
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practical difficulties this raises are acknowledged, it is not obvious that
this warrants a departure from the standard: from a human rights per-
spective, it is difficult to see that people should be forcibly treated
with mind-altering drugs that may have considerable adverse effects
without a reasonable certainty about the positive results. Trial and
error does not belong in a human rights framework.
The second difficulty is that the reasons for the patient’s rejection of
the treatment may be increasingly significant when he or she has experi-
ence of the treatment. If one starts with a framework of non-
discrimination, of course, the reasons for a competent patient’s refusal
of a treatment are not relevant: a competent patient is allowed in law
to refuse treatment for any reason, good or bad, rational or irrational.
That said, the ethical case for compulsion weakens when a patient
objects to a treatment based on his or her actual experience of that treat-
ment in the past. If, based on experience, the service user takes the view
that the potential benefits do not warrant the adverse effects, that is a
particularly powerful argument in opposition to compulsion: any
other result makes a mockery of autonomy. The process of gaining
the knowledge which might buttress a justification of compulsory treat-
ment may therefore also enhance the respect that should be given to the
patient’s refusal of such treatment.
B. Medical Disagreement and the Role of the Court
It was argued above that reasonable certainty of diagnosis, therapeuti-
cally necessary treatment, and outcome should be required before invo-
luntary treatment is contemplated. If such certainty is absent, it is
difficult to see that a human rights infringement is ‘balanced’ by a cor-
responding benefit (if indeed such a balancing is the correct approach),
since the benefit is speculative. The requirement that a therapeutic neces-
sity must be ‘convincingly shown to exist’, as required by Herczegfalvy,
suggests a medical consensus on the appropriate treatment in the
patient’s case, and disagreements between medical professionals are
thus particularly problematic.
The response to disagreements between clinicians goes to the heart of
the issue in Wilkinson itself, where the facts presupposed a real and
legitimate clinical disagreement, and disagreements between clinicians
feature in all the post-Wilkinson cases. The court in Wilkinson can be
seen as adopting a classic judicial approach: evidence should be
presented, including oral evidence if necessary; from this evidence, the
court should reach the relevant findings of fact, and determine the
questions at issue.
While this may be the classic role of a court, the courts themselves
sometimes acknowledge that it is not necessarily a role that they
perform particularly well, particularly on technical medical matters.
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It is thus fair to ask whether it is the right approach: if there is a real and
bona fide disagreement between the clinicians as to diagnosis or appro-
priate treatment, should the court rather than deciding who is correct –
a finding the court is not really equipped for – instead find that a bona
fide dispute exists and the level of certainty to justify compulsory treat-
ment is therefore not met?
This approach was argued in R (N) v M in terms of what might be
conceived as a reverse-Bolam test: if reasonable clinicians disagreed,
the requisite standard of certainty would not be reached, and the treat-
ment would not be convincingly shown to be medically necessary within
the terms of Herzcegfalvy. The submission was rejected, both at first
instance and on appeal,73 essentially on the basis that there was no
prior authority for the proposition, and on the basis that it was a test
of negligence that should not be extended. Neither of these is particu-
larly convincing, as they do not address the more significant point of
how the court should deal with uncertainty or disagreement between
clinicians about diagnosis and appropriate treatment.
On this issue, a Bolam-like approach seems to have much to rec-
ommend it. It must be the case that when faced with a disagreement,
the court can reject opinions that are clearly inadequate. The approach
allows the court to do so: opinions which are outside the range that a
competent body of medical opinion would accept would be able to be
ignored by the Court. In the event of a serious disagreement between pro-
fessionals, all of whom are meeting the standard expected of competent
clinicians, the Court would not have to make a decision as to who is
‘right’, a decision the Court is ill-equipped tomake. That matter deserves
a much more extensive discussion than that accorded in the N case.
C. The Capacity of the Patient
If non-discrimination on the basis of disability is a starting point for
analysis, the capacity of the patient would seem to be of profound rel-
evance. In England and Wales, non-psychiatric treatment is not
imposed on patients who have capacity to consent to the treatment,
even in cases where the refusal seems irrational or where the conse-
quences of refusal are serious to the point of fatal. What can the justifi-
cation be to enforce psychiatric treatment? We do, however, provide
physical treatment without consent in the best interests of people who
lack capacity.74 The presence of a mental illness does not, of course,
necessarily mean that the patient lacks capacity,75 and a parallel
73 See [2002] EWHC 1911, para 113–116; [2002] EWCA Civ 1789, para 29.
74 See Mental Capacity Act 2005.
75 Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819, [1994] 1
WLR 290 (H.C.). Regarding the empirical literature surrounding psychiatric
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approach could be adopted in mental health law.76 If this approach were
incorporated into English mental health law, persons with capacity
could consent or refuse, and patients without capacity could be
treated in their best interests, reflecting the position for non-detained
psychiatric patients and society as a whole for non-psychiatric
treatments.
Such an approach is viewed sympathetically by Simon Brown LJ in
Wilkinson.77 The view of Hale L.J. was to the contrary:
I do not take the view that detained patients who have the capacity
to decide for themselves can never be treated against their will. Our
threshold of capacity is rightly a low one. It is better to keep it that
way and allow some non-consensual treatment of those who have
capacity than to set such a high threshold for capacity that many
would never qualify.78
Since Wilkinson, cases have viewed the presence of capacity as relevant
but not determinative as to whether treatment should be enforced.79
On examination, Hale’s view is problematic. The standard of capacity
in English common law and in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is not
really a low one. The classic array of tests of capacity to consent to
medical treatment is contained in a paper by Roth, Meisel, and Lidz
from 1977.80 They list a range of possibilities, from being able to mani-
fest a choice, up to actual understanding of the information provided.
The English test, like many other modern legislative thresholds of
patients and capacity to consent to treatment, see P Appelbaum and T Grisso,
‘The MacArthur Treatment Competency Study I: Mental Illness and Compe-
tence to Consent to Treatment’ (1995) 19(2) Law Hum Behav 105; T Grisso
and others, ‘The MacArthur Treatment Competency Study II: Measure of
Abilities Related to Competence to Consent to Treatment’, (1995) 19(2)
Law Hum Behav 127; T Grisso and P Appelbaum, ‘The MacArthur Treat-
ment Competency Study III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric
and Medical Treatments’ (1995) 19(2) Law Hum Behav 149.
76 Such an approach is, indeed, adopted in some jurisdictions: see Ontario,
Health Care Consent Act 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, sch. A. For a discussion of
this legislation, see P Bartlett, ‘English Mental Health Reform: Lessons
from Ontario?’ [2001] JMHL 27-43. Available online at ,http://eprints.
nottingham.ac.uk/144/.. Since Rogers v Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (Mass.
1979), incapacity has also been pivotal to decisions regarding involuntary
treatment in the USA. A similar standard of impaired decision-making is
contained in the Scots legislation: see Mental Health (Care and Treatment)
(Scotland) Act 2003, s 57(3)(d).
77 Wilkinson at 30.
78 Wilkinson at para 80. The third judge in Wilkinson, Brooke L.J., did not take
a view on the relevance of capacity.
79 See, eg, R (PS) v G [2003] EWHC 2335 (Admin) para 116; R (B) v SS [2005]
EWHC 1936 (Admin) para 95.
80 L Roth, A Meisel and C Lidz, ‘Tests of Competency to Consent to Treat-
ment’, (1977) 134(3) Am J Psychiatry 279.
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capacity, is higher than any in their paper. It requires not merely an
actual understanding of the information in question, but the ability to
appreciate the consequences of the choice, and of the other choices
open to the patient.81 This is not necessarily a criticism. It may well
be appropriate that we insist that patients should have a reasonably
developed understanding of the nature and consequences of their treat-
ment choices; but it is not a low standard. Indeed, it is somewhat diffi-
cult to see what higher threshold could be phrased in law, and still have
the test one of capacity. Hale’s position is further difficult to maintain
when the actual case law is considered: the courts have seldom held
that a patient has capacity, once that capacity is called into question.82
Hale’s concern that using a threshold of capacity would force the stan-
dard of capacity upwards is not convincing: that pressure already exists
and will continue to exist for physical illnesses. Insofar as the threshold
is to be raised, therefore, it will be raised in any event. It is not obvious
why applying the same standard to psychiatric treatments would affect
this unduly.83
81 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 3(1)(c), 3(4). This largely reflects the common
law test relating to capacity to consent to medical treatment existing at the
time the statute was passed: see, eg, Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2
FLR 427; Tameside & Glossop Acute Services Trust v CH [1996] 1 FLR
762; Re L (Patient: Non-Consensual Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 837.
82 See discussion in P Bartlett and R Sandland, Mental Health Law: Policy and
Practice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) section 10.4. It
would appear that this is not a uniquely English phenomenon. While
interpretation of the Scots legislation is still in its early days, the Sheriff’s
Court has held that the requirement of impaired decision-making in the
Scots act was met on the basis that a patient declined to speak or engage
with staff regarding his treatment: see M v Murray, application B45/09, Sher-
iffdom of South Strathclyde, Dumfries and Galway, 17 April 2009, para 25.
This does not suggest a robust approach to the Scots criterion.
83 Section 58 of the Mental Health Act 1983 itself raises a problem of interpret-
ation here that has to some degree vexed the courts. Treatment of a detained
patient beyond three months may occur only if either the patient has capacity
(as determined either by the responsible clinician or a SOAD) and consents to
the treatment or the SOAD certifies that notwithstanding the competent
refusal, the treatment should appropriately be given. The articulation of inca-
pacity in s 58 requires that the patient ‘is not capable of understanding the
nature, purpose and likely effects of that treatment’: s 58(3)(b). The
absence of a requirement of appreciation in this test suggests that it is argu-
ably lower than the common law threshold, and that contained in the
Mental Capacity Act 2005. This view is supported by the case of R (X) v
Mental Health Act Commission which further emphasises the patient’s
ability to understand, rather than his or her actual understanding: (1988) 9
BMLR 77 (DivCt), eg, at 85. This apparently lower threshold has been
used in some of the post-Wilkinson jurisprudence to marginalise the role of
capacity. In R (B) v SS, the first instance court held under the s 58 test, ‘a
patient might be regarded as having capacity even if he does not actually
understand the nature, purpose and likely effects of the treatment’: [2005]
EWHC 86 (Admin) at para 76. This is not a convincing approach. If a
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While Hale’s argument is problematic, her result should not necess-
arily be dismissed out of hand. Insofar as the tests of capacity are flex-
ible, let alone manipulable,84 results are unlikely to be consistent,
patient is able to understand the relevant aspects of the treatment and yet
does not understand them, the question becomes why this is the case.
Given that the patient has the relevant abilities, it is difficult to see that
actual understanding would not be attainable, given additional effort and,
perhaps, disclosure of relevant information to the patient. Thus a patient
treated with medication covertly, as was the case in RM v St Andrews
[2010] UKUT 119 (AAC), may have lacked actual understanding of the treat-
ment; but this could presumably have been corrected if he were told he was
being treated, and for what. This has obvious human rights advantages.
The absence of a requirement of ‘appreciation’ is however a real difference
between the s 58 test and the approach used for medical treatment more
broadly. It is difficult to see a logical reason to adopt a different standard
for psychiatric and physical treatments. Not unreasonably, the Code of Prac-
tice does not attempt to set different capacity thresholds for treatment under s
58 and for other medical treatments, adopting the Mental Capacity Act
approach as the baseline: see Code of Practice, paras 23.28 and 23.29. It is
therefore open to question how far the lower test in s 58 is actually
applied, and therefore to what degree the distinction between the tests is
relevant in practice.
The drafting of the Mental Health Act provisions and the decision in the X
case pre-date the careful analysis of incapacity law conducted by the Law
Commission, a process that both resulted in the passage of the Mental
Capacity Act 2005, and in the long run-up to that Act, affected the
common law in the area: See Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, Law
Com No. 231 (HMSO, 1995); Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated
Adults and Decision-Making: An Overview, Consultation paper 119
(HMSO, 1991); Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and
Decision-Making: A New Jurisdiction, Consultation Paper 128 (HMSO,
1993); Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-
Making: Medical Treatment and Research, Consultation Paper 129
(HMSO, 1993); Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and
Decision-Making: Public Law Protection, Consultation Paper 128 (HMSO,
1993). There is no suggestion in the reasons of Simon Brown LJ in Wilkinson
that he was considering anything other than the common law standard, and
Hale LJ in that case refers to the common law standards specifically as influ-
enced by the Law Commission reports as the basis of her reasoning: see Wilk-
inson at 66; see also R (B) v SS [2006] EWCACiv 28, para 33. In that sense,
the apparently lower standard of s 58 is a diversion: the comments of Hale LJ
are meant to apply to the higher standard of common law, now also con-
tained in the Mental Capacity Act. In any event, if a capacity threshold
were adopted as relevant for decisions regarding compulsion base in part
on an argument about non-discrimination, it would seem that the same
threshold of capacity must be used for psychiatric and non-psychiatric treat-
ment. Subject to the requirements of the CRPD, it is presumably the test
applicable to consent more generally that should be considered.
84 The degree towhich capacity is insufficiently robust is a matter of dispute. The
judicial decisions relating to incapacity do not inspire confidence in the robust-
ness of the concept: see discussion in P Bartlett, ‘The Test of Compulsion in
Mental Health Law: Capacity, Therapeutic Benefit and Dangerousness as
Possible Criteria’ (2003) 11 Med L Rev 326. More recent empirical literature
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valid, and reliable between decision-makers. This is in itself a reason to
raise concerns about the use of capacity as a threshold, based on the
Sunday Times threshold discussed above.
That said, if an individual is agreed to meet the current standard of
capacity, he or she is therefore able to understand the information rel-
evant to the treatment, to retain the information for a sufficient time
to make a judgment on it, and to appreciate the consequences of the
decision he or she is making, including the consequences of withholding
consent to the treatment and the consequences of choosing other treat-
ments, when available. This is a high standard indeed, and the decision
made by a person with that standard of capacity warrants considerable
deference. The non-discrimination point here is particularly relevant:
why would we impose psychiatric treatment on a person making this
standard of decision, when we do not do so for people making decisions
related to physical health in these circumstances?
A rule that a capable person should be able to refuse psychiatric treat-
ment may prove at least one piece of the best way forward. It is not
entirely unproblematic, however. This is in part because of the malle-
ability in the concept noted above. It is also because the effects of insti-
tutionalisation raise questions about the reality of choices made. This
point was made in the YF case, where concern was raised that the appli-
cant ‘could not have been expected to resist submitting to such an exam-
ination in view of her vulnerability at the hands of the authorities who
exercised complete control over her throughout her detention’.85 This is
in part a result of the perceived power of the authorities in the
institution, but it is also likely to be a function of the nature of insti-
tutional life. While many detentions are now quite short, some are
not. Wilkinson, for example, had been detained for 34 years.86 One
of the post-Wilkinson litigants had been detained for 10 years,87 and
another for 8 years.88 At least since Goffman’s work half a century
ago,89 it has been acknowledged that institutionalisation has effects
on people, inducing specific forms of behaviour. Whether one now
views this behaviour as compliance eroded into an individual by the
system, or the generation of resistance reflected by challenges to the
system in Foucauldean micro-theatres of power, we are a long way
suggests a consistency of capacity determination among doctors in a psychia-
tric setting, however: see R Cairns and others, ‘Reliability of Mental Capacity
Assessments in Psychiatric In-patients’ (2005) 187 Br J Psychiatry 372.
85 YF v Turkey, application No. 24209/94, judgment of 22 July 2003, (2004) 39
EHRR 34, para 35.
86 Wilkinson at para 1.
87 R (B) v SS [2005] EWHC 86, para 8.
88 R (PS) v G [2003] EWHC 2335 (Admin), para26.
89 E Goffman, Asylums (1961).
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from the free and informed consent of liberal theory, and refusals of
treatment must be understood accordingly. The unreality of voluntari-
ness in the context of consent to psychiatric hospital admissions has
long been noted;90 it seems likely that there is a similar haziness sur-
rounding consent to treatment while in psychiatric hospitals, with
capacity not really being questioned as long as the individual is taking
his or her meds, in circumstances where the patient would not meet
any meaningful test of capacity.
All these issues may well become more problematic as the CRPD is
implemented. On some readings, the CRPD requires us to move
beyond the competent/incompetent distinction, to a world where
capacity is never entirely lost, and supported decision-making takes a
new prominence.91 Such an abandonment of capacity as a concept
would be a significant shift in the legal landscape, as a move towards
an increased role for capacity has for a number of years been a part of
the drive for more progressive and non-discriminatory mental health
law.92 While this is not necessarily the only reading of Article 12, it is
a sufficiently prominent interpretation that a number of signatories to
the CRPD entered reservations to the Convention, protecting their
right to allow for substitute decision-making, 93 and initial indications
are that it is the reading of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities.94 Insofar as the result is a lowering or removal of the
threshold of capacity, the temptation is to give additional credence to
Hale’s view, where maximum capacity was traded off to compulsion
of the capable in some circumstances. This would not be consistent
90 The groundbreaking paper on this point was J Gilboy and J Schmidt,
‘“Voluntary” Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill’ (1971) 66 Northwestern
Law Rev 429. Since that time, there has been a considerable array of aca-
demic literature. The matter is further at the core of HL v the United
Kingdom, application no. 45508/99, judgment of 5 October 2004 (2005)
40 EHRR 32.
91 See UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding
Remarks on Tunisia, CRPD/C/tun/co/1, para 23; A Dhanda ‘Legal Capacity
in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for
the Future?’ (2007) 34 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 429, 456–60; Michael
Bach and Lana Kerzner, ‘A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the
Right to Legal Capacity’, report to the Law Commission of Ontario, 2010.
Available at ,http://www.lco-cdo.org/en/disabilities-call-for-papers-bach-
kerzner., accessed 16 August 2011.
92 See, eg, N Eastman and J Peay, Law without Enforcement: Integrating
Mental Health Law and Justice (1999); J Dawson and G Szmukler. ‘Fusion
of Mental Health and Incapacity Legislation’ (2006) 188 Br J Psychiatry
504–9.
93 See, eg, Australia, Canada, and Egypt. The UK made no reservation on this
basis. Copies of all reservations are available online at ,http://www.un/
org/disabilities. accessed 11 May 2011.
94 See UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding
Remarks on Tunisia, CRPD/C/tun/co/1, para 23.
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with the tenor of the CRPD, however, which is specifically designed to
minimise compulsion of people with disabilities.
These comments serve as a reminder that capacity is not without its
problems. And they do suggest that safeguards other than capacity
may well be necessary prior to the provision of treatment without
consent.
D. Resistance to the Treatment
Some of the post-Wilkinson cases have held that the actual resistance of
a patient to the proposed treatment is a relevant factor in deciding
whether treatment should be enforced.95 This must be correct. The
threshold for degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR is met
when treatment is ‘such as to arouse in the victims feelings of fear,
anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them’.96
There is nothing to suggest that people lacking capacity are somehow
immune to feelings of fear, anguish, or humiliation. The existing
English law does allow for the overriding of resistance to treatment
where the intervention is in the best interests of a person lacking
capacity, if the intervention is necessary to prevent harm and if the intru-
siveness of the intervention is proportionate to the seriousness and like-
lihood of the harm.97 There is no reason not to incorporate that
approach into the analysis of compulsory treatment in the Mental
Health Act, at least for people lacking capacity.
If that is the approach taken, many of the issues that arise in the
context of a best interests test, discussed in the next section, will be rel-
evant. In particular, some meaningful processes need to be developed to
ensure that the tests do not become mere ‘tick boxes’, but do in fact
represent real safeguards.
E. Best Interests and Therapeutic Necessity
A number of the post-Wilkinson cases adopted variants of a best
interests model for compulsory treatment, either through provision of a
gloss on the s 58 test as it was then phrased, or independent of that
test. The High Court in R (N) v M applied the common law best interests
95 R (PS) v G [2003] EWHC 2335 (Admin), para 117, distinguishing Wilkin-
son. See also R(B) v SS [2006] EXCA Civ 28, para 62, discussed below.
96 Kudła v Poland (Application No. 30210/96, judgment 26 October 2000),
para 92. The suffering must go beyond that which is inevitable in the
context of a legitimate form of treatment or punishment. While an intent
to degrade or to treat in an inhuman fashion is relevant to the finding of a
violation, it is not a requirement: Peers v Greece (Application No. 28524/
95, judgment 19 April 2001, para 74; Price v UK, Application No. 33394/
96, judgment 10 July 2001, para 30.
97 See Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 6.
542 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2011]
 at Periodicals D
epartm
ent , H
allw
ard Library, U
niversity of N
ottingham
 on N
ovem
ber 21, 2011
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
test98 – a flexible ‘balance sheet’ approach of risk–benefit analysis that
allows for inclusion of medical and non-medical factors, used prior to
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 for decision-making for people lacking
capacity. Similarly, the Court of Appeal in R (B) v SS extended the statu-
tory language to include a best interests test by implication:
The express criteria in section 58(3)(b), namely ‘the likelihood of its
alleviating or preventing a deterioration of his condition’ should
not be equated with the test of whether treatment is in the best
interests of the patient. That question will depend on wider con-
siderations than the simple question of the efficacy of the treatment,
such as whether an alternative and less invasive treatment will
achieve the same result. The distress that will be caused to the
patient if the treatment has to be imposed by force will also be a rel-
evant consideration. English common law and medical ethics both
require that medical treatment shall not be imposed without the
consent of the patient unless the treatment is considered to be in
the best interests of the patient. Thus, while the specified criteria
are obviously critical to the decision of whether the treatment
should be given, they are not the only considerations that are rel-
evant to that question. The SOAD has to certify that the treatment
should be given and we do not see how he can properly do that
unless satisfied that the treatment is in the best interests of the
patient.99
Now that the criteria in section 58 have moved to an appropriateness
standard, it is fair to ask to what degree the new standard mirrors a
best interest standard, and insofar as the latter is relevant, how it
should be determined.
For people without capacity, a coherent argument can be made for the
centrality of a best interests test. As noted above, the threshold for treat-
ment other than that provided under sections 63 and 58 is the best inter-
ests test provided in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, enhanced by the
provisions of that act relating to restraint, if the patient resists the treat-
ment. It is not obvious why psychiatric treatment should be subjected to
a higher standard than other medical care. This might suggest that for
people lacking capacity, the statutory best interests test represents a sen-
sible way forward. This may be the case, but its employment to this end
diverges from current practice in ways that warrant consideration.
The Mental Capacity Act test of best interests requires that the views
of the person lacking capacity be considered, along with the values and
98 [2002] EWHC 1911 (Admin) at para 88–106.
99 [2006] EXCA Civ 28, para 62.
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beliefs he or she would have taken into account had he or she had
capacity.100 While not utterly determinative, the intent of the Act
does seem to be that these factors are meant to hold considerable
sway. This would be a departure from the approach of the Mental
Health Act 1983, which would appear to adopt a more medically
objective test. The difficulties of fitting non-medical factors into the
Herczegfalvy framework have been noted already; in the present
context, the question is instead whether the more subjective approach
of the Mental Capacity Act test is workable and appropriate. Certainly,
it has its advantages. For a patient who would consent to medically
appropriate, albeit suboptimal treatment, this test provides a framework
to consider the strength and relevance of those views. In cases of mani-
fest objective justification, however, the patient’s preferences could be
overridden.
While the Mental Capacity Act approach has its merits, it is proble-
matic in that it provides a range of factors for consideration as part of
the determination, yet no clear way in which to prioritise those
factors. It is all very well to say that the patient’s view should hold
sway unless outweighed by objective factors, but how great a clinical
or other advantage must there be before the views of the patient are
overruled? It is difficult to see that this can be readily codified, but it
raises the question of whether the best interest test in the Act is suffi-
ciently clear that consistency of results can be reasonably assured. A
test of compulsion must not become arbitrary, so the absence of a
robust structure here is problematic.
The views of a list of carers are also to be considered in determining
the individual’s best interests. This too would represent a departure from
the current law (although perhaps not current practice?)101 if applied in
a mental health context, as in the 1983 Act has no role for carers or rela-
tives in deciding whether treatment should be imposed. Once again,
there are advantages to this. If the patient is to be discharged in the
future, the views of the carers regarding treatment may well be pivotal
to the treatment’s ongoing success post-discharge. Involvement of the
carers while the individual is still in hospital can engage them early on
in the treatment process, and establish a relationship of trust between
them and the clinical team. There are also problems that flow from
this, however. Involvement of carers places the compulsion issue into
100 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4.
101 In the event that the treatment becomes subject to an opinion by a SOAD,
Collins J in R (B) v Haddock makes it clear that the SOAD ‘should, if he
thinks it desirable to do so’, consult with the patient’s nearest relative,
family, carers, or advocate: [2005] EWHC 921 (Admin) para 8. This is
reflected in the Code of Practice at para 24.55.
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a social network, where the tradition in human rights law is to look to
the individual as autonomous: relying on carers to justify compulsion
may merely shift the human rights issue from the doctor–patient
relationship to the family–patient relationship. For the person on the
receiving end of the compulsion, this is not necessarily an improvement.
Further, the question arises as to how to respond if the carers are
resistant to treatment that appears to be medically necessary. If mere
consultation is required, then the refusal can be overridden; but if the
carer is a holder of a lasting power of attorney (LPOA) for personal
care which covers the treatment decision, the Mental Capacity Act
approach would preclude the treatment from being given.102 One
could, of course, not allow such binding decisions by attorneys in a
mental health context, but that raises the discrimination question:
what is different about psychiatric treatment that would justify a differ-
ent regime from physical treatment, where such decisions are binding?
Conceivably, such a refusal by the holder of an LPOA might be judi-
cially reviewable, if it was clear that he or she was not applying the
best interests test, although there has yet to be a case where this has
been tested under the 2005 Act. Such an escape would not apply for
advance decisions to refuse treatment under the Mental Capacity Act
2005,103 which raise comparable complexities. To adopt a non-
discriminatory approach, these ought to be as enforceable in a mental
health context as they are in any other medical context. This is not
necessarily impractical: Ontario’s legislation allows the enforceability
of both advance treatment refusals and the decisions of holders of
lasting powers of attorney.104 It would however be a significant depar-
ture from the current approach to mental health compulsion in
England, as it would allow a patient in advance to determine the
scope of treatment applied to him or her under compulsion, during a
subsequent period of incapacity. That said, if the ethical case were
accepted that a competent patient could refuse psychiatric treatment,
it is not obvious why the ethical case for the enforceability of advance
treatment refusals would not equally follow.
For people with capacity, best interests may perhaps be a sine qua non
of compulsory treatment, but it cannot be sufficient. People with
capacity are permitted to make decisions against their best interests in
other areas of life; it is not obvious why decisions regarding psychiatric
treatment are different. Not all decisions in an individual’s best interest
will be therapeutically necessary. They are different concepts and
102 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 6(6).
103 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 24–26.
104 See Ontario legislation discussed above. Regarding a controversial decision
on this matter, see Starson v Swayze [2003] SCC 32, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 722.
Med. L. Rev. Compulsory Treatment for Mental Disorder 545
 at Periodicals D
epartm
ent , H
allw
ard Library, U
niversity of N
ottingham
 on N
ovem
ber 21, 2011
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
different standards. The argument here closely parallels the distinction
between appropriate treatment and therapeutically necessary treatment.
Even if best interests are a sine qua non of compulsory treatment of
people with capacity, it is not obvious that the Mental Capacity Act fra-
mework provides a helpful model of best interests, relying as it does to a
considerable degree on ascertaining what the views of the patient would
be if he or she had capacity. When the patient in fact has capacity, this is
not an issue. It is similarly not obvious what the people required to be
consulted under the Mental Capacity Act would bring to the table
when the person has capacity. If best interests are simply as perceived
by the patient, the test will not assist, since a patient considering treat-
ment to be in his or her overall best interests is likely to consent to it. The
use of a best interests test must therefore involve the imposition of a
different person’s view of the patient’s best interest onto the patient,
raising obvious issues of social control. The ethical justification for
such an imposition is at best problematic.
F. The Right to Process
The conflicting factors of the best interests test are but one example of a
much larger problem. While certainly, considerable improvements can
be made to the precision of the statute law regarding treatment in psy-
chiatric hospitals, inevitably the law cannot cover all eventualities,
and disagreements will arise. A practical and effective mechanism
does need to be established to determine these disputes. This was the
point of Wilkinson itself: where it is alleged that an individual’s rights
are being violated, there must be a forum to determine that issue, and
it must be determined to a reasonable level of certainty. It flows
further from Articles 6 and 8: the requirement that an intervention is
to be prescribed by law means nothing if the application of the law
cannot be challenged in individual cases, to ensure compliance.
Leaving the matter to the sole discretion of clinicians is not in the end
acceptable: they are likely to be too caught up in the situation to be per-
ceived as objective, and if it is accepted that the test should be more than
medical, it is not obvious that they are best placed to balance the overall
range of factors for consideration.
It is not obvious that the appropriate body to engage in this
enquiry needs to be the High Court, or the Court of Protection. It
may well be that a suitably trained review tribunal would do at
least as good a job. The point at the core of Wilkinson remains
strong, however: human rights are at issue, and a meaningful
process must be established.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The compulsory treatment of detained psychiatric patients has long
been left essentially to the discretion of the responsible clinician. Few
if any legal standards have been applied in the vast bulk of instances,
and no legal process is routinely available to patients wishing to chal-
lenge their treatment. Wilkinson provided a false dawn in this regard.
Hearings were few, and there have been none reported for 5 years.
The ECHR jurisprudence in the area is undeveloped and unsatisfactory.
With the increasing attention of the last decades paid to human rights
in a mental health context, and with the introduction of the CPRD in
2008, it is difficult to see that this is a sustainable situation. The time
has come for a serious discussion of when, if at all, compulsory treat-
ment should be imposed. Such a discussion will no doubt raise fears
of patients ‘rotting with their rights on’, but this is not the experience
in countries that have moved to enhance patient rights in this area:
log jams can be broken.105 It further cannot be concluded from the
fact that we have always had compulsory psychiatric treatment that it
is vital in the future, and it certainly does not follow that the current dis-
cretionary system is not open to challenge. An intelligent debate is
required, taking into account empirical research into the positive and
negative effects of compulsion and the doctrinal frameworks of
mental health and human rights.
105 In the leading empirical studies, no patient for whom the doctors availed
themselves of procedures for compulsory treatment was eventually left
entirely untreated: see S Hoge and others, ‘A Prospective, Multi-center
Study of Patients’ Refusals of Antipsychotic Medication’ (1990) 47 Arch
Gen Psychiatry 949; J Kasper and others, ‘Prospective Study of Patients’
Refusal of Antipsychotic Medication Under a Physician Discretion Review
Procedure’ (1997) 154 Am J Psychiatry 483.
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